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T H E  I N S A N I T Y  D E F E N S E  A N D  T H E  T H E O R Y  
O F  M O T I V A T I O N  
The rule which makes insanity a defense against criminal culpability 
obviously needs some justification beyond just the intuitive belief that 
insane persons are to be excused, or that it is poindess and unjust to 
punish them in view of the (supposed) fact that they are unable to obey 
the law. The rule needs to be consistent with and supported by what 
we know of psychology, and with a general philosophical theory of the 
system of the criminal justice. What follows is an attempt in this direc- 
t-ion. 
What might a philosophical justification of the system of criminal 
law be like? There have been recent claims that a convicted criminal 
should be punished, as payment of a debt to society, or to make up for 
the unfair advantage he has taken over others who are lawabiding. 
But a widely accepted view is that the criminal law - and indeed 
every human institution - is justified if it can function so that it op- 
timizes the general good. This view could be questioned, and if it is we 
could go on to defend it by examining the story on a deeper level, 
arguing that rational and informed persons would support, or want, for 
a society in which they expect to live a lifetime, only institutions which 
are benefit-maximizing. 1 (This view is not very different from that of 
Rawls 2 if we make some additions to his concept of rationality and 
drop his proposed strategy of maximin reasoning, along lines suggested 
by John Harsanyi.) 3 
J See tL B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and tke Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979) cbs. 10 and ll. What is there said about a social moral system can be trans- 
posed to hold of a legal institution. 
2 John Rawls, A Tkeoty of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) chs. 
1-3. 
3 John Harsanyi has argued that Rawls' basic conception leads to the idea that insti- 
tutions including morality should be devised so as to maximize average utility. 'Can 
the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of  John Rawls' 
Law and Philosophy 7 (1988) 123-146. 
© 1988 byKluwerAcademicl)ublishers. 
124 R. B. Brandt 
If we take the benefit-maximizing line, we can go along with a 
thesis described by Plato: 
In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done 
wrong in the past, or punishing him on that account, unless taking vengeance like a 
beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime 
that has been committed - after all one cannot undo the past - but for the sake of 
the future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment, 
someone else, from doing wrong again .... Punishment is inflicted as adeterrenM 
If we are receptive to this general view about when institutions are 
acceptable, we hold that the aim of the legal system should be to maxi- 
mize the general well-being, taking all the costs into account. More 
specifically, what the criminal law should aim to do is to maximize the 
general well-being, and to minimize the damage of crime and anxiety 
about the possibility of crime, at least human cost - that is, in part, 
without the infliction of pointless injury or suffering on anyone. It is 
widely, and rightly, supposed that this objective is best achieved by the 
public enunciation of general prohibitions (primarily against injury to 
others or their property), accompanied by threats of punishment for 
those who fail to conform, threats that are mostly made good. But 
since the liberty and welfare of the nonconformers are themselves 
goods which have an equal claim to respect, the system must be 
devised so that their rights to liberty and welfare are overridden only 
to the extent necessary for the general welfare. It is partly in order to 
protect these rights of the nonconformers that the system of criminal 
justice recognizes a set of justifications and excuses which protect the 
nonconformers when punishing them would serve no important social 
purpose. So much for general philosophical background. 
The general idea, then, is that an optimal system of criminal justice 
will provide protection of the general welfare by a system of threats 
aimed at deterring the convicted from repeating, and deterring others 
Theory', American Political Science Review 69, 37--63; 'Morality and the Theory of 
Rational Behavior', SocialResearch 44, 631--6; and 'Basic Moral Decisions and Alter- 
native Concepts of Rationality', Social Theory and Practice 9, 231-44. 
4 Put in the month of Protagoras, in Protagoras 324. But see Republic 614 ft. and Laws 
862 ff. 
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from emulating them. But what is deterrence? Presumably, it is the 
impact on the motivation of  possible offenders so that they are more 
inclined to obey the law than they otherwise would have been. 
1. THE THEORY OF MOTIVATION 
I now turn to the theory of  human motivation. If  this theory is accept- 
ed, the psychological assumptions on which the insanity defense is 
based must  be substantially revised, but not necessarily the main thrust 
of  the insanity rule itself, although I think that it too may be improved 
in certain details. 
But, first let me note a general assumption of psychological work on 
the theory of motivation (and all other branches of psychology): that 
human behavior is an instance of  causal laws? As the Statement of  the 
American Psychiatric Association on the Insanity Defense says: "Psy- 
chiatry is a deterministic discipline that views all human behavior as, to 
a good extent, 'caused'"? Various legal writers would reject dfis 
assumption, regarding it as inconsistent with any defensible theory of  
criminal justice, some writers saying that if everything a person does is 
caused then illness and badness are merged and the law should excuse 
everything. But there is, as we shall see, no reason to think that the law 
must  excuse everything if causal determinism is accepted. And, sup- 
pose we adopted the alternative view that human behavior is not 






a defensible view of responsibility? Indeed, the system of  
justice, in holding that legal sanctions may improve the 
and deter h im and others, seems to suppose that human 
is caused. A few philosophers 7 drink there is a viable middle 
but  I propose to ignore diem. 
s Anyone who is doubtful whether anything is really known about "laws" of moti- 
vation or the brain-state background should consult a very recent review, Douglas 
C. Mook, Motivation: The Organization of Action (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1987) chs. 3, 9, and 10. 
6 December 1982, p. 14. 
7 R.M. Chisholm, 'Freedom of Action', in K. Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism 
(New York: Random House, 196@ 28-44; and 'The Agent as Cause', in Action 
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Some writers who reject the view that human behavior is caused 
seem to take this view because they think a person can be justly pun- 
ished only if and to the degree that his action was morally blameworthy. 
How, they ask, can a person be morally blameworthy for an action if its 
occurrence was written in the stars? But what does the term "morally 
blameworthy" mean? Need we think that the applicability of this term 
presupposes that behavior is uncaused? I suggest that a useful interpre- 
tation of "the act was morally blameworthy" is "the agent would not 
have committed that act but for an unacceptable level of  character or 
moral/legal motivation". 8 (This is like saying that dropping a fly ball is 
an "error" only if so doing shows a substandard level of skill.) This pro- 
posal does not tell us how we are to define "unacceptable level of 
character or moralAegal motivation", and I shall come to that. But it is 
clear that, given this explanation, an act can be morally blameworthy 
independent of  its having been caused - and irrespective of how an 
agent got his character and motivation. An act can be morally blame- 
worthy on this conception if it manifests an unacceptably substandard 
motivation now, even if its agent is as he is because of his genes, faulty 
upbringing, etc. One might ask: why define "morally blameworthy" in 
this way? One answer is that such a definition has implications accept- 
able to our intuitions. Another is that the definition makes it sensible 
for the agents of  blameworthy acts to be negatively reinforced by 
punishment or social disapproval, thereby profitably improving the 
level of  their motivation, which "blameworthy" implies is defective and 
needs improvement. 9 
Theory, eds. M. Brand and D. Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), 199-211. Mso 
Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). 
These theorists can argue that the criminal law does not cause any modification for 
behavior, but simply makes clear to the prospective criminal that his options for 
choice are narrower or more unpleasant, than he might otherwise have thought. 
8 Cf. R.B. Brandt 'Blameworthiness and Obligation' in Essays in Moral Philosophy 
ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958); and IL B. Bran&, 
Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959) chap. 18; and 'Traits of 
Character: A Conceptual Analysis', American Philosophical Quarterly 7, 23-37. 
~) It is worth noting that the frequent affirmation of the importance of"flee will" in 
the literature on punishment in general and the insanity defense in particular may 
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With these background remarks behind us, let us consider what the 
theory of  motivation affirms about human behavior. 
In the first place, motivation theory, like the law, is concerned only 
with acts, bodily movements which are voluntary in a sense which 
excludes movements which are reflex, i.e., that occur during uncon- 
sciousness or sleep and during hypnosis. This agrees with the view of  
the Model Penal Code (hereafter MPC), which says that a culpable 
action must be a "product of  the effort or determination of  the actor, 
either conscious or habitual") ° 
About acts of  this type the theory of  motivation puts forward some 
"laws". These laws could stand more evidence, but I think they are the 
best we have at the present time." The empirical evidence for the laws 
comes from such work as that on achievement motivation, experi- 
ments in industrial psychology, etc) 2 But the laws are also just an 
empirically supported elaboration of the common-sense view that, 
when making a decision, we line up tile pros and cons for each action 
(the outcomes), estimate the probability of  each, and ask ourselves how 
much we want each. Then we try to sum. 
What, as I think, the currendy best-attested psychological (non- 
neurological) theory asserts is that every voluntary action is a function 
of the following variables: (1) what the agent manages to think of  (at 
the time of  decision) as options for choice; (2) the agent's beliefs, at the 
time of  choice, about the possible consequences of. these various 
have been misunderstood by some; it may well be that at least many writers have no 
intention of using "free will" to imply lack of causal law. They may think that all 
free will really requires is that people make choices in the normal "rational" way: 
noting their options for action, their likely consequences, the desirability of these, 
and choosing accordingly. This conception does not imply lack of causation. 
10 1.13 (2) and 2.01 (2). 
~l Persons who have put forward these laws often, 1 thi~lk, do not assume that they 
are basic laws, but speculate that they are ultimately explainable by the physiology 
of the brain, in other words by principles of physics and chemistry, given the way 
the brain is structured. We can leave this open. 
~2 For a review of some of the evidence with citations of data see R. B. Brandt, A 
Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) chap. 3. For a much 
fuller account, see Mook, op. cit., chs. 9 and 10. 
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options (counting the kind of act as itself a consequence), as well as 
how likely they are, given a particular act; (3) how strongly the agent 
wants (possibly unconsciously), or is averse to, the act and its expected 
consequences, at the time of choice; and (4) how vividly the agent rep- 
resents these outcomes and their relationship to the act - what a 
person in some sense believes but is not salient in his thought may not 
influence his choice. 
We might put this in other words as follows: the strength of an 
agent's tendency to choose one of  the options open to h im is a sum, 
of the intensity of  his desire/aversion toward each anticipated con- 
sequence of that option, reduced by the believed improbability of the 
consequence occurring if that option is taken, and reduced again by 
any lack of  salience of  that consequence and its relation to taking that 
option in the awareness of  the agent - summing over all the antici- 
pated consequences of  taking that option. The the theory affirms that 
the choice the agent actually makes is for the option he has the 
strongest tendency to take - for which this sum is greatest. (One may 
wonder how in the world numbers are to be assigned to these, so that 
it is sensible to talk of the largest "sum". I am going to assume that 
there is an intuitive understanding or at least an ordering of how much 
we want certain outcomes, how probable we think they are, and more 
dimly how nearly the representation of each approaches the vividness, 
say, of sensory perception). This "law" is only approximate and needs to 
be filled out in many details. For obviously the ordinary person has 
only vague notions of  probability, has little idea of  what it is to want 
something more or less strongly or how to form a product of this 
strength of  want and probability, much  less how to go about summing 
these products. There is a large literature about the contortions people 
go through when they are trying to decide which car to buy, or even 
which sandwich to purchase - within the framework of  the sketched 
conception of  laws applicable to human behavior." 
l~ Experimental data show that individuals do not very reliably estimate the proba- 
bilities of outcomes, given their evidence. Moreover, we are not equipped with any 
summing device which enables us to know which sum of products comes out 
highest. There are all sorts of strategies individuals use to solve this problem, and all 
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A good many philosophers who do not question the above psycho- 
logical causal account want this causal account filled out with a good 
many more details. What these details are is controversial. But some- 
thing like the following is probably as near as we can get to an agreed 
view. First, a person's thought of a possible course of action being most 
strongly wanted, along the lines I have sketched, will result in the ~ r -  
mation of an intention or disposition to follow a staged plan of action. 
(Some philosophers debate what an "intention" is, some holding it is 
just an everything-considered preference for or pro-attitude toward an 
action plan, TM others insisting that it is more than this, partly because 
intentions persist and mould future plans? S ) This intended plan of 
action will presumably fix when it should be executed, and when that 
time is (believed to be) now the agent will (supported by the intention 
but also by the underlying desire for the outcome) begin to execute the 
plan by trying, or willing, to bring about the first stage of the plan, 
usually a certain bodily action - a "willing" the nature of which is 
itself debated (sometimes thought of as the focusing of attention on 
the projected bodily action, sometimes as involving an image of the 
sensation characteristic of the intended movement). This action will 
result in the setting of an appropriate next stage of the plan, or even in 
the wanted outcome. (If one wants more light in the room, theact  of 
sorts of proposals as to what these strategies are. See Mook, oi) cir., and various 
review articles in the Annual Review of Psychology: j. R. Bettman, 'Consumer Psy- 
chology', 37, 257-89; G. E Pitz and N.J. Sachs, [ludgment and Decision' 35, 139-- 
63; H.J. Einhorn and R.M. Hogarth, 'Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of 
Judgment and Choice' 32, 53-88, especially 69-77; and P. Slovik, B. Fischhoff, and 
S. Lichtenstein, 'Behavior Decision Theory' 28, 1--39. Also see D. Kahneman and A. 
Tverskry, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk' Econometrica 47, 
263--91. 
~4 Donald Davidson, Essays on Action and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) pp. 
98-100. For more clarification of this view, see the following foomote on his reply 
to Bratman and pp. 220 ff. 
is See Michael Bratman, 'Davidson's Theory of Intention', in Essays on Davidson: 
Actions and Events, eds. B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985). Also his forthcoming (Harvard) Intentions, Plans and Practical Reasons; and his 
'Taking Plans Seriously', Social Theory and Practice 9, 271-87. Davidson replies 
lucidly in eds. B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka, ibid. 
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pulling the drapes aside will be enough.) The intention will, unless 
there is a change of  mind, remain through the period necessary for 
reaching the desired outcome, monitoring the sequence of  actions in 
view of the feedback resulting from earlier members of the sequence, 
and other information) 6 
We should note that all of  this is consistent with holding that, 
directly or indirectly, acts are caused by a complex of the agent's beliefs 
and desires/aversions. 
Among the desires/aversions which control behavior are some of 
especial interest to the law:. (1) empathic/sympathetic concern for 
others, including an aversion to injuring others and to disasters like a 
nuclear explosion, and a desire to give assistance to others in distress; 
(2) aversions to theft, lies, rape, etc., learned in various ways, but proba- 
bly mostly because of  its having been made clear to an agent that they 
are normally harmful to others; 17 (3) a desire to pay attention to laws, 
because they are intended for the welfare of  all and enacted by a 
democratically elected body; (4) an aversion to doing what is con- 
sidered morally wrong; (5) finally, motivation not to perform actions 
10 See, for example, Bruce Aune, Reason and Action (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977) chaps. 
1 and 2, pp. 137-42; A. I. Goldman, Ioc. tit, and 'The Volitional Theory Revisited' in 
Action Theory, eds. M. Brand and D. Walton, (Dordrecht. Reidel, 1976); Hugh 
McCann, 'Volition and Basic Action', Philosophical Review 83, 451-73; L. H. Davis, 
Theory of Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 38 ft., 59--93; John 
Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 83- 
135; Wayne Davis, 'A Causal Theory of Intending', American Philosophical Quarterly 
21, 43-54; G.A. Miller, E. Galanter and K. H. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of 
Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), especially Ch. 4; William 
James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1913), II[ 
487-92; A. G. Greenwald, 'Sensory Feedback Mechanisms in Performance Control: 
With Special Reference to the Ideo-Motor Mechanism', Psychological Review 77, 
73-101. 
17 See Martin Hoffman, 'Developmental Synthesis of Affect and Cognition and Its 
Implications for Altruistic Motivations', DevelopmentalPsychology 11, 607-22; 'Moral 
Development' in Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology, ed. P. Mussen (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1970), II, pp. 261-359, part on "the inductive method"; and 
'The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Development', in Empathy: A 
Developmental Perspective, eds. N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
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for which the law provides sanctions - to do so is risking unpleasant 
consequences. I shall call these "moral/legal motivations". 
Now, if the above model of motivation theory is correct, these 
motives have to compete with various other desires: for food, water, 
sex, human company, compliments, financial security. Moreover, there 
are emotion-based desires. People desire to act aggressively when 
angry, to escape when fearful, to restore a relationship when grieving. 
When emotions occur they markedly change the structure of motiva- 
tions in the person at the time. 
There is one feature of what I am calling "moral/legal motivations ~ 
which distinguishes them from many of the desires/aversions with 
which they compete for control of conduct. This is that they may be 
called "standing"; they are relatively fixed and permanent unlike 
desires for food or sex. (They are not the only desires with this status; a 
person's motivation to achieve is also relatively unchanging.) An 
empathic person does not suddenly cease to be so on the following day. 
The same for aversion to injury of others, theft, lies, rape, etc. And the 
same for the aversion to being the target of the law's criminal sanctions. 
Of  course, these standing motives may not always control conduct: 
each has a certain level of strength, and in many situations this will not 
be enough to control behavior in the face of desires stronger at that 
t ime. 
II. W H A T  CAN THE SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DO? 
Let us now address ourselves to the question: What can the system of 
criminal justice do to insure that people conform to the law? 
First, I have listed five kinds of desires/aversions which are forces 
inclining a person to conform his conduct to the law. Can the system 
of legal penalties strengthen any of these? Of  course it can strengthen 
the fifth (motivation to avoid the penalties of the law) by making the 
penalty heavier or more certain; and it can add to the strength of the 
first and second (aversions to injuring and to specific offenses like 
theft), by conditioning, by negative reinforcement of  the agent or 
vicariously by his observation of what happens to others. The law can 
also bring about, by conditioning, that we notice more options for 
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action, and attain a more vivid awareness of the consequences. (A hefty 
fine for running a red light tends to make one think that one had bet- 
ter begin to slow down when the yellow light appears. Lengthy incar- 
ceration may not have this effect.) 
A different thing that might be done is to reduce the strength of 
desires/aversions which lead to breach of law: whether to get money, 
satisfy sexual desires, obtain a position of status in the community, and 
so on. Since such motives are formed mostly by the example of parents 
or other prestige figures, by the educational system or by fare provided 
by the mass media such as television, there is not much the law can do 
about them. What the legal system can mostly do is increase compet- 
ing aversions, to theft, etc., in the way already suggested. 
Now if the purpose of the system of criminal justice is to enhance 
general well-being by control of crime at least cost, we can see why it 
should and mostly does refrain from punishing various types of in- 
fringement of the statutes. For sometimes it is better that people do 
infringe the statutes, e.g., by actions to promote public goods, such as 
burning down a house when necessary in order to prevent a general 
conflagration. We want behavior of this sort. We call this sort of in- 
fringement of the statutes '[justified" infringement of statutes - "law- 
ful" in the broad sense. Violators of this sort are not held guilty of 
unlawful action. But there is a wider group of cases in which the law 
should not and generally does not punish (what we may call "excused" 
unlawful behavior), e.g., when the act would have been lawful if the 
situation had been what the agent thought or at least reasonably 
thought it was; when there was ignorance of the law (perhaps ignor- 
ance from which a reasonable man would suffer); action under 
"duress"; actions done as a result of involuntary intoxication by alcohol 
or drugs (perhaps because of addiction); "entrapment"; and (as miti- 
gating) provocation. (Some of these "excuses" can be accommodated in 
the definitions of various offenses, requiring that they be done willfully, 
purposefully, recklessly, or negligently.) 18 
18 The MPC appears to compound confusion by putting these mental conditions 
into the definition of the crime. As Glanville Williams has pointed out, this move 
makes for difficulties in deciding the criminality of accessories. See his 'The Theory 
of Excuses', Criminal Law Review 1982, 734 ff. 
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Why not punish in these cases? In the case of justifications, the 
answer is obvious: we want people generally to do what the agents did, 
in their circumstances. The answer in the case of excused behavior is 
different. We must recall that the primary effect of punishment on the 
convicted is to affect motivations (and vividness of representations). 
But in the case of "excused" behavior punishment may not optimize 
the good, for change of motivations is not needed since as far as we 
know the agent's motivations are already at an acceptable level. A 
person who acts illegally because of an honest mistake is not shown 
thereby to have a defect of motivation. There is no point in trying to 
improve the agent's motivation, if he is, as far as we know, already 
where he ought to be. And as for the effects on others, there is not 
evidence that failure to punish in "excused" cases decreases deterrence, 
that is, the motivation of others not to commit crime because of their 
knowledge of punishment in the nonexcused cases. Much less would 
punishment, or the threat of it, affect the motivation of those to whose 
behavior such excuses would apply, since the threat of punishment can 
hardly operate to deter a person who commits an offense because he is 
ignorant of facts which make his act illegal. The system of excuses 
avoids inflicting pointless harm on persons who have not conformed 
with the law. 
Some may be disturbed by the implication that a main aim of the 
criminal system should be to affect motivations in one way or another. 
It is true that the effect of the law may be somewhat educational 
cognitively: by emphasizing the standards of conduct as well as the 
probable consequences of a certain kind of action. But the main impact 
of the criminal system must surely be to affect motivation. This may 
seem to conflict with the idea that the criminal law does not concern 
itself with motivation. But this conception that the law is not con- 
cerned with motivation seems to ignore the fact that there are two 
kinds of motivation, the motives which lead one to break the law, and 
also motives (mostly aversions) about breaking the law, stealing, killing, 
etc. These latter motives surely are of interest to the law. Suppose we 
say Jane is guilty of a crime because she tampered with the brakes of 
her husband's car, knowing it would bring about his death. The legal 
scholar may say Jane has mens tea because she knowingly acted to bring 
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about his death. But when we take motivation theory (and common 
sense) into account, it is clear that what is responsible for Jane's tam- 
pering with the brakes and thereby producing the death of her hus- 
band was not merely her wanting the money etc., and knowing that 
tampering with the brakes would bring about the things she wanted; 
what is also responsible is her relative indifference to bringing about her 
husband's death. So, but for that indifference, her action would not 
have occurred. Thus, while the MPC makes the normal condition of  
criminality that the agent do something forbidden, either having the 
act or its consequences as his "conscious object", or knowingly (= will- 
fully) 19 performing the act with its anticipated consequences, or 
recklessly (with awareness of  the risk) doing a forbidden thing, it could 
as well say that a condition for conviction of  a crime isfailure to be moti- 
vated to avoid a foreseen forbidden consequence, or to be indifferent to 
a substantial risk that it occur. Thus talk about intention or foresight 
(which some have thought identical with mens rea) is misleading; it is 
true that an intentional act is in part a cognitive occurrence - there 
must be a plan, a cognitive map for future action, however simple - 
but it is an essential part of an intentional action that there should be 
motivation to get the end envisaged by the plan (or to avoid it), and 
what a person foresees but ignores is evidence about what he is indif- 
ferent to. 2° 
In view of the foregoing, it seems the law could say that a prohibited 
action, unjustified, is culpable only if it manifests (has as a necessary con- 
dition, in the circumstances) a defective level of  moral~legal motivation. 
(The defective motivation is a "necessary condition" of an action if and 
19 MPC 2.028. 
20 There are parts of the MPC which take motivation in my broad sense (both 
desires and aversions) into account: in its statement about the excuse of duress, 
about the effect of renunciation of criminal purpose when there has been an 
attempt, about "extreme indifference to the value of human life" (210.2 (lb)), or 
about the aggravating effect of the purpose of a murder being "pecuniary gain", or 
the act's "manifesting exceptional depravity" (210.6 (3) g, 11)). 
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only if the action would not have occurred but for the motivation.) 21 
This is a conclusion of considerable importance. 
It might be objected that this proposal cannot be right, for it sup- 
poses a person can be convicted of a crime only when there is known 
to be a defect of  character/motivation, when in many cases all we 
know about a person's mental state is this single action - and how 
then could we be justified in saying that the condition of defective 
motivation is met? (One might equally well ask whether the action was 
purposeful or done knowingly.) But this objection overlooks how we 
can justifiably make judgments about motivation on the strength o f  a 
single action. If a person is playing a friendly game of  tennis, and if in 
the middle of  it a child has a bad spill from his bicycle in the next 
court, and is screaming and covered with blood, and the person calmly 
continues with his tennis, we do draw an inference about his motiva- 
tion, and it is a well-founded inference if we do, at least absent some 
explanation. 22 Not that this inference comes out of  the blue: we know 
how sympathetic or emphatic people normally behave in comparable 
circumstances. This man can hardly be either. 
So the commission of  an illegal unjustified act can be viewed as 
prima facie evidence (which is rebuttable by further explanation) that 
there is a defective level of  character or moral/legal motivation. What a 
legal "excuse" does is not provide evidence that the agent's character/ 
motivations are perfect, but merely shows that in the circumstances it is 
unwarranted to infer defecfve motivafon from the particular unlawful 
act. And if defective motivation is a condition of  culpability then an 
excuse is a shield against culpability. 
This is as it should be since, as remarked above, one of  the purposes 
21 What I mean by saying that a certain motivational defect is a necessary condi- 
tion of an event (illegal act) in the circumstances, is that there is a general natural 
law to the effect that whenever an act of the type in question occurs in circum- 
stances like the present, there is always a defect of legal/moral motivation of some 
sort. This is to say that when the act occurs, the defect must have been present, or 
the act would not have occurred but for the defect. 
22 See R.B. Brandt, 'Traits of Character: a Conceptual Analysis', American Philo- 
sophical Quarterly 7, 26. 
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of the criminal law is to improve in the agent (and others) any defec- 
tive level of motivation relevant to lawabidingness, and if there is no 
ground in the agent's action for thinking his motivation defective, the 
punishment is uncalled for, serves no purpose - even that of deter- 
rence of others. 
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
The thesis I suggest about the insanity defense is that it is essentially 
the claim that the state of mind of the agent at the time of his unlawful 
act prevents conclusive inference from his act to a defective level of 
moral/legal motivation (as being its necessary condition), hence it 
provides a release from culpability. Some of the concepts in this pro- 
posal need explanation, which I propose to offer. This proposal differs 
from the widespread view that the justification for excusing acts done 
in an insane frame of mind is basically that insanity involves an inca- 
pacity to obey the law, either cognitive (can't know what the law re- 
quires) or volitional (knows what the law requires, but unable to con- 
form conduct to it). And it is thought to be senseless and unjust to 
punish in face of this incapacity: senseless because penal sanctions 
could not reach him (or others in his situation by the threat of them), 
and about the kind o f  incapacity there is to obey the law. Hence we 
shall see that there is reason to be unhappy with the legal rule about 
have a "fair chance" to obey the law.) We shall see, however, that there 
is obscurity about both the sense in which there is a cognitive defect, 
and about the kind of incapacity there is "'to obey the law. Hence we 
shall see that there is reason to be unhappy with the legal rule about 
the insanity defense as it now stands, and with this standard rationale. 
Let us look both into this obscurity and at the same time into 
problems of the law about insanity as it now stands. 
Let us look at the statement in MPC, the most widely accepted rule 
at present. It says 23 that a person "is not responsible for unlawful con- 
duct if at the time.., as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub- 
~ 4.Ol (1). 
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stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of  his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law" [my 
italics]. Further, "mental disease or defect" does not include any ab- 
normality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti- 
social conduct. 24 The statement of the law does not say anything about 
a rationale. 
There are some things about the MPC rule which are not satisfac- 
tory. First, a minor point. We might ask what is a "disease" or 
"defect'. 25 Is this to include a mild neurosis, or any one of  the problems 
listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (of the Psychiatric Asso- 
ciation) edition III, or an I.Q. below 80? The implication of  the MPC is 
that any level passes if it is serious enough to cause a "substantial 
inability" to identify illegal conduct or to avoid conduct which is 
illegal. 26 Very well. ~Substantial inability" is rather vague, but this is 
probably not a defect since the concept probably could not be spelled 
out in detail, and there are some things which can be left to the good 
sense of the jury and judge. 
But, and more serious in its vagueness, what is it to "appreciate" the 
immorality/criminality of one's act? Evidently something more than 
just readiness to say that an act is wrong. What  else more? Some 
writers talk about the "emotional meaning" of  the act (or of  
"immorality" or "illegality"). Does this mean ability to represent the 
whole situation (and the wrongness of  the act?) to one's self vividly (a 
factor which we saw above is one of  those of which action is a func- 
tion), with corresponding emotional repercussions? Or is it awareness 
of generally accepted social standards for behavior of the kind in ques- 
tion? Or is it to have at least some reasonably strong aversion to perform- 
24 4.01 (2). 
25 Thomas Maeder offers a definition in Crime andMadness (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1985), p. 85. 
2~ The American Psychiatric Association, in its 1982 report on 'The Insanity 
Defense', proposed that exculpating mental disorders ~must be serious. Such dis- 
orders should usually be of the severity - if not always of the quality - of condi- 
tions that psychiatrists diagnose as psychoses". This view conflicts with the MPC 
and is too restrictive, as will become clear below. 
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ing acts of  that kind for reasons other than self-interest - a state which 
many contemporary philosophers would say is part o f  what  it is for a 
person to think a certain action is morally wrong? Moreover, the MPC 
does not make up its mind whether  responsibility is contingent on a 
person's believing that his act is "criminal" or "(morally) wrong-  
ful". If the accused's belief that his action was immoral  is relevant for 
responsibility, then someone needs to straighten out  just  what  "thinks 
the action was immoral" actually means. Such an important  concept in 
the statement o f  the law ought to be reasonably precise in meaning. 
just  what  is the cognitive condition for culpability supposed to be? 2v 
Finally, and most important, the vagueness in the concept of  lack of  
"substantial capacity.., to . . .  conform his conduct  to the requirements 
of  the law". There  are, o f  course, some things a person physically can- 
not do - for instance, move his car in a no-stopping zone when  there 
is a traffic jam. The  law does not require h im to do these things. From 
the determinist's point o f  view a person in a sense cannot do any- 
thing other than what  he in fact does, being the kind of  person he has 
become. So presumably "lack of  capacity" must  refer to something else. 
Usually there is no question but that the accused was physically able 
to refrain f rom doing what  he did, e.g., fire a revolver. Is it an inability 
to control behavior? 28 But if  our account of  motivational psychology is 
correct, this concept hardly belongs in a scientific psychology and what  
is called "self-control" boils down to some fact about the relative 
27 See the opinion by Judge Cardozo in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N~E. 
945 (1915). 
28 Wechsler seemed to explain "will" and "self-control" in terms of"amenability to 
influence by the law". Correspondence between M.S. Guttmacher and Herbert 
Wechsler in Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft # 4, (Philadelphia: American Law Insti- 
tute, 1955), printed in American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tentative Drafts 
Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, American Law Institute, 1956, p. 192. 
Sir James Stephen remarked in 1883 that the "power of self-control must mean a 
power to attend to distant motives and general principles of conduct, and to 
connect them rationally with the particular act under consideration, and a disease 
of the brain which so weakens the sufferer's powers as to prevent him from attend- 
ing or referring to such considerations, or from connecting the general theory with 
the particular fact, deprives him of the power of self-control". A History of the Crim- 
inalLaw of England, II (1883), p. 170. 
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strength of aversions to a certain sort of behavior. ("Self-control" is the 
fact that the act/consequences are so aversive that they stand out in the 
agent's thinking and he is motivated to avoid them.) 
I suggest, then, that, in line with our psychological' knowledge, we 
might explain this "lack of capacity" as follows: to say that a person 
lacks capacity to conform is to say that, even if his legal/moral motiva- 
tions were at an acceptable level, he might still not obey the law on 
account of some (other) mental/brain state he is in. 29 (In the case of 
such a person a defective state of motivations is not a necessary condi- 
tion of his failure to obey.) This proposal would seem to allow us to 
excuse the effect of the sudden impulses of the kleptomaniac, or of 
deep brooding, or of the inability to represent the r.elation of con- 
sequences to action, or of some breakdown of the whole system of 
motivational control, perhaps as a result of brain-damage - the con- 
cept of "other mental/brain state" is open-ended. 
I suggest then that what the law expects of a person, if he is to be 
held nonculpable for some offense, is that the strength of the agent's 
standing motivations mentioned as support for obedience to law - 
empathy/sympathy, aversion to the act-type in question, respect for 
law, fear of the penal sanctions of the law - be in sum not less than an 
acceptable (not necessarily average) level. And the function of 
argument for noncnlpability in the law, and of the insanity defense, is 
to make it reasonable to believe that what the agent did is causally (not 
merely logically) compatible with his (moral, etc.) desires/aversions not 
being below that acceptable level, although prima facie unlawful beha- 
vior indicates a defect of moral/legal motivation. 
The basic idea of the insanity defense, then, I suggest, should be that 
some actual mental/brain state of  the agent (not necessarily a "mental 
disease or defect" in some specified sense, like those identified as of a 
type listed in DSM III) other than the "standard" grounds for excuse 
could have prevented him from abiding by the law despite the pres- 
ence of an acceptable level of moral/legal motivation. We might put 
this more formally as follows: ' ~  person is culpable (responsible) only if 
29 Guttmacher speaks of the "overwhelming force of the unconscious in many 
seriously disordered patients". Loc. cir., p. 172. 
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his act - an act within the meaning of the law (as explained earlier) - 
would not have occurred in the presence of a sum-total acceptable level of 
standing aversion to breach of law, and to immorality, and to injury to others, 
and to the specific type of action in question, and to the sanctions of the law". 
Alternatively we can say that an unlawful act is nonculpable when an 
agent's mental/brain condition is such that his act (might have) oc- 
curred even if he otherwise possessed an acceptable level of  moral/legal 
motivations. 3° (Of course, we need some explanation of"an acceptable 
level" of moral/legal motivations.) My suggestion is that the statement 
of the MPC should be interpreted in this way. 
This proposal is not really different from the MPC in its implica- 
tions for the obvious cases. It is the conceptual framework that is 
different, and there could be difference on border-line cases, depend- 
ing on how the MPC is interpreted. (I say nothing about the final 
clause relating to sociopathic cases since a defense of insanity would 
hardly be mounted on the basis merely of a criminal record.) The 
MPC could be construed to say, it if takes motivational theory into 
account, that no defect of motivation is proven on account of mental 
disease or defect; whereas my proposal is that no defect of motivation 
is proven on account of the presence of some other state of mind, 
including ones not identified as some recognized form of insanity. On 
either view, there is no point for law to aim at improving the legal/ 
moral motivations of the accused for they may not need improvement. 
Nor can punishment be justified on the ground of deterring others 
(not merely those mentally like the accused)in view of the infrequency 
of the insanity defense and the even smaller frequency of its success. 
My proposal enables the insanity defense to be part of a general theory 
of excuses. My proposal is also compatible with essentially a "product" 
theory of the insanity defense: the excused offense might not have 
occurred but for some mental/brain state of the agent different from 
his moral/legal motivations. 
30 The U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. District Circuit (312 E 2d at 851) held that a 
"mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which sub- 
stantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior 
controls" [my italics]. This leaves open the question of how to determine that a state 
of the mind is "abnormal". 
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My proposal, then, is that an agent should be held culpable or non- 
culpable in the circumstances cited. But it is a different question under 
what conditions we can properly infer (or the court or jury can infer) 
that one of these conclusions fits the evidence, that it is defective moti- 
vations or possibly "some other" mental/brain state. The answer to this 
can seemingly only be that the truth of one assessment or the other can 
properly be inferred from its being the best and simplest explanation of 
the unlawful act when the total evidence is taken into account. 
It is reasonable to expect that it is the job of the defense to bring for- 
ward and support arguments in favor of such a claim of nonculpability, 
and to expect to succeed by a preponderance of the evidence, not 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is in presenting and interpreting the "total evidence" that the psy- 
chiatrist (or a character witness) will enter the picture. If he is testifying 
for the defense presumably he will explain the evidence for thinking 
that the accused's motivation, emotional state, defect of cognitive 
processing, or total breakdown of the machinery (e.g., extreme schiz- 
ophrenia) was of a certain sort as well as why his evidence calls for a 
certain sort of interpretation. It is for the jury to decide whether such 
an explanation offered by the defense psychiatrist, or a defective level 
of moral/legal motivation as asserted presumably by the psychiatrist 
for the prosecution, is the best and simplest explanation of all the facts. 
What sort of evidence might support a conclusion that the accused 
should be excused as "not guilty by reason of insanity" (as distinct from 
being excused on some such ground as mistake of fact or duress)? One 
Would be a record of emotional instability in the past, e.g., if the 
accused had been under treatment by a psychiatrist for that reason. 
Another would be the record of a recent head injury of a kind often 
followed by bizarre behavior. Another would be just reports of recent 
strange behavior or the reports of examination by a psychiatrist. In 
contrast to this would be "character"-witnesses: evidently the past 
manifestation of a high level of moral/legal motivation (say when there 
was strong self-interested motivation to do something incompatible 
with this) is pertinent - and we think that such motivation is relatively 
permanent. What the jury has to do is to make a common-sense 
reconstruction of the accused's motivation. The very absence of a 
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motive for the crime is itself a relevant fact. The jury must try to iden- 
tify the motive (if any) which led to the crime and whether this motive 
should have been weaker than acceptable contrary moral/legal motiva- 
tion. Or it may find that the accused's motives had no rational connec- 
tion with what he did, thereby pointing to an infirmity of the reason- 
ing process rather than to defective motivation as the source of the 
offense. 
This proposal may at first sight seem less precise and convincing 
than the formulation in the MPC. But provided we can make a couple 
of conceptions clearer, it seems more simple. Moreover, it has the 
virtue of placing in center stage the concept of adequate moral/legal 
motivations, thus making clear why an insanity defense is sensible. The 
law excuses when all that its sanctions can affect is, as far as we know, 
already in good condition, when punishment would inflict pointless 
harm. 
I have suggested that the proposal contains some terms which call 
for explanation. These are: "the best or simplest explanation", and "an 
acceptable level of moral/legal motivation". We must say somet~ng 
about them. 
The first does not present any real difficulty. Philosophers have 
argued ~it length about the proper meaning to be assigned to "best and 
simplest explanation'. But the general idea is familiar enough for a jury 
to work with. They are presumably familiar with discussions of what is 
"the best explanation" of the Challenger disaster, or the collapse of a 
bridge, or the failure of a car to start. No more than such examples, I 
think, is needed for understanding the concept involved. 
The second notion, that of an "acceptable level of moral/legal moti- 
vation" is another story and calls for a fuller account. 
The first thing to note is that apparently the ordinary person's con- 
ception - hence the community standard - of an "acceptable level of 
moral/legal motivation" is roughly close to the law, as indicated by the 
relative severity of authorized sentences. People regard a willingness to 
kill another adult human being except in defense of self and others as 
wholly unacceptable, although there are circumstances in which a 
person's killing is less than normally objectionable, i.e., when there is 
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provocation, or extreme need. Of  course, a man's foresight into con- 
sequences and the representation of them may be dimmed by angry 
desire which makes his behavior less objectionable (and is a mitigating 
factor) but still not acceptable - his anger would not have controlled 
his behavior if his aversion to killing had been up to par. What a 
person does recklessly, indifferent to a risk, say of killing someone, is 
also unacceptable but less objectionable than killing someone either as 
an end in itself, or as a means to the agent's ends, or as an expected 
consequence of an act. All this conforms with legal conceptions o f  
merited punishment. How about assault or battery? It is clear that a 
person is falling short of community standards if he strikes (except in 
games, etc.) or even touches another in an unwelcome way. But, as in 
the law, this is viewed as far less objectionable than a willingness to kill. 
And so on down the line. For the most part, community standards 
agree that a man's lack of aversion to an act-type can be ordered in 
degree of acceptability, in roughly the same order as is indicated by the 
range of sentences authorized by the law. But only in general. Laws 
which impose a penalty on behavior which does not injure anyone in 
person or property conform less well with community standards. The 
same applies for the felony-murder rule. Moreover, there is so much 
disagreement on some matters that one can hardly claim there is a 
"community" standard at all, e.g., euthanasia and various kinds of 
sexual behavior. But despite these reservations the extension of the 
concept "an acceptable level of legal/moral motivation" seems not 
objectionably undear. Of  course, the jury will have to draw the line 
about when motivation is "acceptable". Members of a jury may dis- 
agree among themselves, but the hope is that their conclusion about 
what motivation is acceptable, after discussion, will be representative 
of "community standards". Presumably members of the jury will be 
reasonably familiar with community standards on such points, and 
indeed are themselves, we hope, representative of those standards, so 
that mostly they need only look within. 
Some courts have not overlooked the importance of community 
standards as something which a jury should bear in mind in its deci- 
sion whether an act shows defective motivation (= morally blame- 
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worthy). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island 31 said that the jury is to 
"evaluate the defendant's blameworthiness in light of  prevailing com- 
munity standards". 
There is, of course, no black and white line here which makes it easy 
for the jury to decide which is the "best explanation". One can feel 
some sympathy with George Will's remark, 32 cited by Joseph E. 
diGenova and Victoria Toensing, 33 "The most morally indefensible 
crimes are becoming the most legally defendable,., the more odious 
the crime - premeditated or spontaneous - the more reasonable 
doubt there is about the person's sanity at the time". This objection, 
however, will hardly be convincing to readers who reflect on a recent 
case of  Henriette Cornier, a woman who asked to be allowed to take a 
neighbor's 19-month-old child for a walk, took the child up to her 
room, severed its head, threw the head out of the window, and calmly 
waited for the police. 34 Is this a "morally indefensible crime?" The act 
was morally wrong all right, but this is not to say it was morally 
blameworthy. Was there possibly something very wrong with the 
accused's mind/brain state, different from her standing moral/legal 
aversions, which produced such a hideous action? The decision by the 
jury in some such cases may not be easy. Mr. Will is right that when 
something horrible is done which seems wholly unmotivated, which 
members of a jury cannot imagine a normal person doing in those cir- 
cumstances, there is some presumption of "some other" mental 
problem, unrelated to standing moral/legal motivations. This is where 
the record of  previous behavior (and while in detention) is relevant. 
The jury may make mistakes where there is no sharp line but the job 
of the jury is to do the best it can. 3~ (It is not clear that the decision is 
31 State v. Johnson 399 A. 2d 469, 1979. Cited by D. H.J. Hermann, The Insanity 
Defense (1983: Charles Thomas, Springfield, I1.), p. 55 f. 
32 Baltimore Sun,June 24, 1982, AI9. 
33 'The Federal Insanity Defense: a Time for Change in the Post~Hinckley Era', 
South Texas Law Journal, 1984, 728. 
34 Cited by Maeder, op. cit., p. 42. 
3s The British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment proposed (1953) an 
equally indeterminate job for the jury, affirming that a person is not responsible for 
his unlawful act if "at the time of the act the accused was suffering from disease of 
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any harder than that required by MPC: whether the accused was suf- 
fering from such mental defect or illness that he was substantially un- 
able to conform to, or appreciate the legality [morality] of his action.) 
The severity of the problem is somewhat mitigated, as we shall see in a 
moment, in that the disposition of convicted criminals and those 
judged not guilty by reason of insanity will not be very different in a 
rational system of penal and mental institutions. Incidentally, the 
proposal comes out exactly where the MPC does on the matter of 
sociopathic individuals who seem precisely to lack adequate moral/ 
legal motivation and are therefore guilty. 
V. THE D I S P O S I T I O N  OF THE N O T  GUILTY BY REASON 
OF I N S A N I T Y  
What should happen to persons who are judged not guilty by reason 
of insanity or "guilty but insane"? Obviously they should be commit- 
ted to an institution for observation and treatment. Release could come 
fairly rapidly (the court having decided they were "insane" at the time 
of the offense but possibly not now). The use of drugs may remove the 
symptoms (say, of schizophrenia) quite rapidly and they may remain 
suppressed for some length of time, perhaps permanently. Psychologi- 
cal therapy can have the same effect. If the crime was a crime of vio- 
lence, of course, procedures should be more strict for it is already 
known that the person is somewhat dangerous to society. In such cases 
gradual discharge, probation, frequent reports to the therapist for a 
time, and general monitoring of progress are in order and should be 
mandatory. 36 Some of these may be beyond treatment, and hence their 
free circulation in society would be a dangerous thing. The prospect of 
early release will not encourage average persons with standard legal/ 
the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held 
responsible". Cited by S. H. Kadish, s.j. Schulhofer, and M.G. Paulsen, Criminal 
Law and its Processes (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), p. 834. 
36 As proposed by the court in Benham v. Edwards, U.S. District Court ND Geor- 
gia 501 Suppl 1050, 1980. 
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moral motivations to break the law. Deterrence will be maximized for 
the average person by the mere prospect of a criminal trial. The stigma 
of being judged mentally defective will itself be a substantial dis- 
couragement to crime. 
How will this differ from treatment of persons who are convicted, 
in view of their unlawful action, having manifested a defective level of 
their moral/legal motivations? A defect of moral/legal motivation is 
itself a kind of mind/brain defect. One hopes that many cases of this 
can be treated successfully by therapy, probation with regular reports 
to a probation officer, placement in a job, and so on. In the case of 
"sociopaths" or "hardened criminals" this may not be possible. It may 
be that their defect was a result of experiencies during the early years 
of life and cannot be remedied by anything done later. Then they 
should be kept out of circulation for the sake of protection of society, 
except in so far as determinate sentences are required by the values of a 
liberal democratic society. 
There is another point to be remembered: if one is a determinist, 
one will think that defect of legal/moral motivation resulting in crime 
is no less a matter of genes, upbringing, etc., than is the case with the 
mind/brain problem of those adjudged insane. Some persons have had 
the advantage of good genes (intelligence, health, energy) and family 
upbringing and location in society which not only produce good 
moral/legal motivation, but also assure that they will not be put in a 
position where they are strongly motivated to disobey the law. With 
others the opposite is the case. There is an unjustified inequality in the 
lottery of life, which bestows good things on some and bad things on 
others. We all have a moral obligation to work toward the amelioration 
or removal of these inequalities. But that is not the job of the criminal 
law. The system of criminal justice is an uneasy compromise, attempt- 
ing to accommodate both the need to protect society from harm and 
to avoid imposing pointless suffering on those who have broken the 
law. 
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